«Rationale Trennung» or «Marriage d’Amour»? History and Philosophy of Educational Research

Karin Priem

University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg

e-mail: karin.priem@uni.lu

Lynn Fendler

Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, United States

e-mail: fendler@msu.edu

Abstract: This article focuses on disciplinary interrelationships between philosophy and history within the framework of educational sciences. It deals with the epistemological, material, political, and categorical conditions of permeability, some of which initiate a separation of historical science from philosophy, whereas others allow, on the one hand, for history to profit from philosophy and, on the other, for philosophy to profit from history. The article illustrates how both history and philosophy benefit through reciprocal openness within education as an academic field. Permeability between history and philosophy in educational research may draw attention to lacunae on both sides and challenge methodological stereotypes and seemingly unavoidable dispositions of reasoning, the recognition of which may contribute to an enrichment of educational research.

Keywords: History; philosophy; Educational Sciences; methodological fetishes of modernity; permeability of academic disciplines.

Received: 06/10/2016
Accepted: 08/06/2017

1. Introduction

For some approaches to philosophy, history is irrelevant. For some approaches to history, philosophy is irrelevant. We would like to reflect on things we have learned about the epistemological, material, political, categorical conditions that have made it possible to separate history from philosophy, and also that make it possible for history to inform philosophy and for philosophy to inform history.

1 An earlier German version of this article was published as: Priem & Fendler (2015).
2. The Integration of History and Philosophy: Liberal Arts and the Material Turn

History and philosophy have not always been separate. In some intellectual circles, history and philosophy are again not separate. In this paper, we use both historical and philosophical approaches to examine the current assumptions, limitations, distinctions and potential interrelationships between history and philosophy.

Philosophy and history had been blended for most of recorded history; this seems to be the case not only for Western historiography, but also for East Asian historiography (see, e.g., Wu, 2013). The integration of history and philosophy can be intuitively grasped when we think about Western classical studies. For example, in ancient Greece, Clio (Muse of History) was also known as the Goddess of Poetry. *The Iliad* and *The Odyssey* function simultaneously in history, philosophy, and literature.

The «Middle Ages» are so named by historians because that period is regarded as *philosophically* distinct from the preceding and subsequent historical periods. When historians or philosophers use the term «Middle Ages», they invoke an historical period that is characterized by a particular absence of Western European philosophical contributions. If historians had been less focused on philosophy as the necessary defining element during the millennium between 500 and 1500 CE, then that millennium might be more commonly referred to as the era of Arabic Science, or it might have been divided into two periods called something like the Byzantine and Crusades periods of history.

Also in the tradition of classical studies, Renaissance intellectual life is characterized by its focus and cultivation of the «liberal arts». We see the integration of philosophy and history not only in Renaissance studies of architecture, science, and literature, but we also see evidence of the integration in philosophical and historical definitions of the very terms *Renaissance* and *Renaissance Man*. For example, encyclopedic philosophy says this about the Renaissance:

> one of the most important hallmarks of Renaissance philosophy is the increased interest in primary sources of Greek and Roman thought. (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Similarly, encyclopedic history says this about the Renaissance:

> Historians first use [the term Renaissance] (from about 1840) for the period from the 14th to the 16th century, implying a rediscovery of rational civilization (exemplified by Greece and Rome) after the medieval centuries seen as superstitious and artistically primitive (History World).

According to mainstream *historical* accounts, both the Renaissance and the Enlightenment have been characterized precisely in terms of their *philosophical* advancements, especially in secularism and rationality. By the terminology of their labels, «The Renaissance» and «the Enlightenment» are historical periods
that, unlike «The Thirty Year War» or «The Bronze Age», have been defined and delimited by their philosophical characteristics. Similarly, according to mainstream philosophical accounts, the Renaissance has been identified as a time of increased interest in history, especially classical documents and the rebirth of historical values. The Enlightenment has been characterized by the accumulation of encyclopedic knowledge. The Renaissance has been so named by historians precisely because of its studied attraction to the past, and the Enlightenment has been so named by historians to render it in contrast to previous historical eras.

In the nineteenth century up to the beginning of the twentieth century, history often has been dedicated to the study and creation of monumental historical works, gathering encyclopedic knowledge about epochal events and outstanding historical figures. In academic philosophy scholars have often dedicated themselves to hermeneutics, interpretation and reinterpretation of classical texts. There has been a tendency to aggrandize and venerate the past, both in history and philosophy, which typically came along with detailed knowledge about facts and classical texts. This tendency of course evoked critique as will be discussed further below. The last third of the twentieth century provoked a sociological turn in historiography. Now societal structures, hierarchy and power, social classes, and less privileged groups of the past have been put to the fore of historiography. The study of, for example, workers and their families, women and children in history has opened up new horizons of historical sources; everyday artifacts and serial textual sources became important archival material.

At the end of the twentieth century New Cultural History raised artifacts, visual sources and popular texts to prominence as vehicles of meaning creation by historical agents. Discourse theory gave way to the interpretive analysis of all these diverse sources as texts and elements of discursive fields that had a huge impact on everyday practice. It was the material turn in historiography that recast things and artifacts as powerful actors which, while being situated in time and space, could not simply be translated into texts and discourses (c.f. Priem, Casale & König, 2012, pp. 7-12). Bruno Latour’s actor-network-theory for example can also be read as a new philosophical approach to establish a symmetrical anthropology between objects or things and humans. The Modern western philosophical tradition to draw a strong line between the material world and the world of reason, and to establish a dualism between physical body and mind is being fundamentally questioned and, in the long run, this challenge has provided the conditions for emergence of the writing of new kinds of historical/philosophical analyses (see, e.g., Fendler, 2012; Priem, 2014).

We can see this pattern of interwoven history and philosophy extended over centuries, an integration that lasted approximately until the nineteenth century, and resumed in other forms with postmodernity. When we take a broad historical perspective, the issue becomes not how it may be possible to integrate history and philosophy, but rather how it had become possible to separate them.

For purposes of the following argument, we borrow Foucault’s claim that modernity is discontinuous from both Enlightenment and postmodernity. We argue that the dispositif known as modernity has inscribed Kantian epistemological categories in the historical ethos constituted by coherence, taxonomies, rationality, mind-body split, privilege of the visual, nation-building, institutionalization, and
generalizability. In the following section we suggest that the separation of history and philosophy became possible as part of the constitution of modernity. Modernity provided the conditions of emergence for the separation of history and philosophy.

3. When History and Philosophy Got Divorced: Ranke as an Exemplar of Modernity

What are the historical and epistemological conditions that have made it possible to separate philosophy and history? To explore this question, we begin with an examination of the work of Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886). If we were writing in a modern intellectual tradition of actor-centered analysis, we might contend that Ranke was the founder of modern history, as some modern historians and philosophers claim he was. However, in an attempt to avoid an actor-centered analysis, in this section we refer to Ranke’s work as a particular illustration of Historizmus, an exemplar that both shapes and is shaped by the modern ethos of history.

Ranke is most famous among historians for having insisted that history be written to record the past «wie es eigentlich gewesen» [the way it actually was]. Interestingly (for our argument), Ranke made both explicit and implicit arguments in favor of separating the discipline of philosophy from that of history. Explicitly he wrote:

> There are two ways to become acquainted with human affairs: through the knowledge of the particular, and through the knowledge of the abstract. There is no other method. Even revelation consists of the two: abstract principles and history. *But these two sources of knowledge must be distinguished.* (Ranke *World History*, 1881-88. GHDI; emphasis added)

Implicitly Ranke’s work created and sustained an ontology that reiterated a separation between the objective world «out there» and the subjective responsibility to perceive and record that objective world. Ranke argued that history should not be written to uphold cultural universals (which he relegated to philosophy and called «a priori grounds») but rather history’s task was to record Naturgesetze [laws of nature], which existed out there, objectively in the world. In Ranke’s work, philosophy does not concern itself with objective facts of the world, so history must separate itself from philosophy in order to become more scientific.

At the same time, however, Ranke’s writing sustained religious beliefs in its approach to scientific history:

> The business of history is to perceive the existence of this life, which cannot be described by a thought or a word. The spirit which appears in the world is not of such a conceivable nature. It fills all the boundaries of its being with its presence; nothing about it is accidental; its manifestation is founded in everything (Ranke *World History*, 1881-88. GHDI).
As part of his project to impose analytical coherence on both philosophy and history, Ranke’s arguments advanced the premise that God’s spirit (as nature or essence) was manifest in all things:

I believe ... that the science of history is called upon to find its perfection within itself, and that it is capable of doing so. By proceeding from the research and consideration of the individual facts in themselves to a general view of events, history is able to raise itself to a knowledge of the objectively present relationships (Ranke World History, 1881-88. GHDI).

Ranke’s epistemological stance combined scientific objectivity with religious belief, so it would be misleading and reductionist to interpret his work as if it were only one or the other. At the same time, recognition of the religious dimension of Ranke’s helps us to recognize some of the complicated commitments of so-called «scientific objectivity» as they were manifested in modern history. In this section, we examine aspects of Ranke’s work from both historical and philosophical perspectives, with the aim of illustrating the ethos of modernity in which it became possible, and eventually even natural, to separate history from philosophy.

Historically speaking, we can see Ranke’s work as having emerged in the context of nation building in the early nineteenth century. One way to interpret Ranke’s work is as an effort to prevent French revolutionary thinking from being imported into Germany, an attempt to invent a kind of history in which there was no hint of a transcendent «revolutionary spirit» that could be applied to all countries. Ranke’s work can be seen as a defense of the Prussian monarchy as the German nation’s natural historical essence, and against liberal democratic sentiments, which (heaven forbid) might be French by nature.

Some insight into Ranke’s work can be gleaned when we notice that his historiography was contemporaneous with that of Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, and J.S. Mill. Positioned against Hegelian dialectics, such intellectual projects made discursive moves to exclude any metaphysical or utopian thoughts from history. For Ranke, historiography’s inherent law was objectivity, and objectivity seemed to be the «nature» of history and science. Ranke’s work exemplified the modern epistemological ethos of institutionalized positivism that also animated Comte’s, Mill’s, and Spencer’s work.

If we look at Ranke’s work philosophically, we can see that his approach illustrates the growth of positivistic thinking that can be seen as a critique of the idealism that had been promoted in the works of Hegel. In one sense, the modern move to separate history from philosophy imposes a particular kind of analytical coherence on both history and philosophy. No longer are the bases for coherence and connection based in time and space. With the analytical turn, connections are defined instead in terms of timeless metaphysical concepts such as objectivity, utility, and perfection.

The following table lists archetypical characteristics of history and philosophy as they have been discursively constructed in the philosophical and historical context of modernity, and exemplified by Ranke’s work. In order to play with the idea of seperability, and to signal that this analytical separation (between history and
philosophy) is oversimplified and dehistoricized almost to the point of parody, we
have labeled the characteristics as fetishes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modern Philosophical Fetishes</th>
<th>Modern Historical Fetishes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Universal reason</td>
<td>Archive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The pure eternal idea</td>
<td>Chronology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representational language</td>
<td>Humanist agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcendent values</td>
<td>Causality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normativity</td>
<td>Continuity and progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherent value of rationality</td>
<td>Nation-state (or other essential categories</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Philosophical fetishes seem to have a generalizing power; they are heading to «horizons» of thinking and not to «top down views» or «topographical» analyses of what is actually or factually to be discovered. Historical fetishes seem to be grounded and sensible; they appear to avoid ideological bias and inspire confidence in scientific validity. Philosophy seems to be the warm and blossoming section of reason, whereas history seems to be a cold sphere of control and order. But we also see a tendency of philosophy and history to influence and to have an eye on one another, to even cooperate behind the scenes in places. In the next section we will inspect a critical phase, a «rationale Trennung», of philosophy’s and history’s relationship and suggest how this separation found a preliminary rapprochement.

4. Critique of the Modern Rationale Trennung between History and Philosophy

The splitting of philosophy and history in modernity – characterized by taxonomies, principles of classification, order of knowledge, and belief in factual truth during the 18th and the 19th centuries– provoked critique. Philosophers like Nietzsche already at an early stage diagnosed a «glacial stage» of thinking or knowledge production fundamentally lacking inspiration and meaning (c.f. Priem, 2001). This accusation was addressed to the sciences and to history as well, namely historicism as, for example, designed by Ranke with considerable success. National libraries, public archives and prestigious museums, all of which were found in the nation states of nineteenth century Europe (c.f. Osterhammel, 2009), are still powerful representations of history’s success story. According to Tony Bennett (1995) during the nineteenth century museums played a role in the creation of a particular kind of historical knowledge: «museums produced a position of power and knowledge in relation to a microcosmic reconstruction of a totalized order of things and peoples» (Bennett, 1995, p. 97).

Criticizing the tyranny of historicism, Friedrich Nietzsche (1874/2013) in his writings argued that domination by history, addiction to historical facts and a belief in history as an eternal law can be read as a clear sign of the rigidness of thought and of ideas and ideals suffocating in the dust. Nietzsche fought materialism, positivism, empiricism and historicism because he thought of those isms as uninspired academic exercises without any existential meaning, and based on utility only,
even if Nietzsche’s own work retains traces of metaphysics in concepts such as the Übermensch. The glacial reign of history in particular, according to Nietzsche (c.f. Kittsteiner, 1993), therefore should be overcome by the work of sovereign individuals, who would act and think in a life-oriented way, seizing the presence/present life while rejecting the dictatorship of historicism. These sovereign individuals would counter history by enthusiastically exploring new horizons of thinking, whereas historical plagiarism and mere repetition of the past would disable a creative design and anticipation of the future also with respect to the nation state. Nietzsche was fighting historicism as a barrier to free thinking, a critique that goes against the dominant modern ethos of rationality, which Nietzsche relates to a certain narrow-mindedness, control of knowledge, resignation, essentialism and paralysis of life (c.f. Safranski, 2000, pp. 104-130). Nietzsche’s polarization between history and inspiration is very much in favour of a philosophy that rejects academic traditions of classifications and order imposed on knowledge. As for history, Nietzsche thinks it is a hopeless case, whereas philosophy might allow us to think beyond limits and to open up new horizons. History in Nietzsche’s view is a petit bourgeois cage or prison of thought.

Nietzsche’s philosophical critique of historicism has been extended by Heidegger and Gumbrecht. In the first third of the twentieth century Heidegger also subjected cultural formulas, established traditions and the historical imprint of life to inspection from a different angle, which still seems to inspire today’s reflections on research methodologies. Inspired by Heidegger, in his 2004 book on the «production of presence», Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht – a scholar of Romance studies and professor of comparative literature at Stanford University – reflected on a methodology of research without making use of interpretation or discourse – and constructivist-oriented approaches. He introduced the term «presence», or «production of presence», to stress the tangibility and proximity of materiality in time and space beyond interpretation and the assignment or construction of meaning. According to Gumbrecht, interpretation, while inevitable, reduces and ignores the substance of materiality, sensual perception, and culturally unfiltered stimulation and therefore needs to be challenged by alternative epistemological concepts. For the same reason Gumbrecht refutes discourse- and constructivist-oriented methodologies. Instead he aims for a concept that is much more complex than mere reflection on the construction or extraction of meaning. As a result Gumbrecht feels obliged to go back to Martin Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit (Being and Time, originally published in 1927). He is attracted to Heidegger’s work because of the German philosopher’s anti-metaphysical position, which, according to Gumbrecht, is based on the assumption of (thing-related) substantial «being» («Sein») in space as a horizon of potential cultural manifestations and meanings. Gumbrecht here claims to have discovered similarities to his own intellectual engagement and to how he would like to define the term «presence». «Presence» as a paradigm of research according to Gumbrecht provides access to a materiality and epistemology beyond fixed interpretation. The idea of «presence» therefore might offer access to a historiography, which is brushing history against the grain of chronology, structure, factual truth and established patterns of interpretation. Presence could refer to absence or silence of archival sources, absence of facts, absence of structure, etc. In this way, Gumbrecht’s work exemplifies a particular critique of the modern separation of philosophy and history.
«Presence» and «Sein» after all can be related to phenomenology and thus material existence, and as such question constructivist and linguistic methodologies in a way that allows for permeability between history and philosophy. As already mentioned above, material studies, both philosophical and historical, are eager to step back occasionally beyond the symbolic matrix of culture. Instead material studies work with manifold possibilities of perception, action and interaction. This also can be applied to visual artifacts. Their «presence» could reveal what Gombrich (1982, p. 37) had described as «visual discoveries» as we sometimes «recognize pictorial effects in the world around us, rather than the familiar sights of the world in pictures».

The separation of history and philosophy is further problematized in the work of Roland Barthes (1980/1985). In his reflections on photography, Barthes has described the medium as a verification of existence in the sense that what we find depicted in photography provides evidence of past material existence. His approach to photography is able to bridge phenomenology and history by reflecting on historical presence or existence found in visual sources beyond the level of cultural or historical formula. Photography in his opinion is rather contingent and enigmatic, it thereby often displays material evidence beyond meaning, and consequently challenges interpretation by means of historiography. Thus, photography is able to surprise (often by baffling details) and Barthes has referred to this unique quality as «punctum» (e.g., p. 36). «Punctum» in turn refers philosophically to «presence» or «Sein» and is able to distinctly refer to manifestations beyond the matrix of history or culture. «Punctum» therefore is able to point to the silences of historiography, which need to be further reflected upon.

To the extent that our intellectual discourse has challenged modern epistemological commitments, it has become possible to critique the separation of disciplines and to see the separation as a product of a modern Weltanschauung that is neither inevitable nor an indication of progress or intellectual advancement.

5. Possibilities for Permeability

It is not possible to return to a Golden Age of integration between history and philosophy. There are institutional departments in universities, quasi-corporate conference structures, commercial interests in research and publication, conventions of language use and citation practices, titles of endowed chairs, economic investments in grant-funding foundations, ideological preferences, and political mechanisms of governance in place now that tend to establish and sustain relative autonomy and separation between disciplines. We do not imagine that ISCHE and PES will be eager to organize a joint conference any time in the near future.

However, there are many contemporary scholars whose studies tends to work across the disciplines in new non-modern ways. The most obvious examples of challenges to disciplinary boundaries are contemporary theorists including Michel Foucault, Bruno Latour, Judith Butler, Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, and Nigel Thrift. These theorists have generally been labeled as «post-structuralist», «post-humanist», or «post-empiricist». One of the characteristics that has disqualified such post-empiricist work from the traditional disciplinary labels is its tendency to challenge
the modern boundaries that have been established between academic disciplines. In the following section we suggest a few areas in both philosophy and history that may be enhanced by permeability.

5.1 How Permeability Can Help Philosophy

History can help philosophy acknowledge that concepts get created and transformed by different times and spaces; recognition of these transformations helps to challenge limits in what it is possible to think. For example, when philosophy holds reason to be an essential faculty or cognitive process, then the tendency is to assume that Cartesian reason is a concept beyond time and space as is the case with Kantian reason. When reason is assumed to be essential and timeless, the relationship between reason and non-reason is not susceptive to a wide range of debate or critique.

History can help philosophy to avoid attributing ideas to individuals’ achievements (hagiography). Modern philosophy frequently invokes humanist agents (often other philosophers) to explain the invention of ideas and change over time. The humanist agent, also called the transcendental subject, appears in philosophical accounts not only through biographies and hagiographies, but also in analytical approaches such as actor-network theory and critical pedagogy. We can recognize ghosts of humanist agents in claims such as «Kant synthesized rationalism and empiricism» or «Maria Montessori changed the way it is possible to think about educating the poorest of the poor». The assumption that history is shaped by humanist agents imposes a kind of determinism, and even a kind of alienation, on how it is possible to think about the relationship between people and change.

History can help philosophy to recognize that individual people in history will be completely ineffectual, and will remain faceless and unknown, except when their actions fortuitously align with and happen to get taken up in the heat of the moment, in a hospitable growing environment that is conducive to some changes, but not to others. This perspective is analogous to the situation in which organisms in a laboratory cannot grow unless they are provided with a suitably nourishing growing culture. When philosophy glorifies the humanist actor, then philosophy becomes hagiography. This approach to philosophy carries with it ethical implications, too, because hagiography tends to portray the possibility of historical change as being dependent on the actions and endowments of individual heroes. From that standpoint, hero-centered philosophy also serves a conservative and reproductive function in which heroes are regarded as indispensable to human advancement. Such a portrayal of history imposes a particular kind of determinism that both relies on divine endowment and devalues the roles of inter-relationships, power, and serendipity or chance.

History can help philosophy think about how particular texts and authors became seen as «classical». In traditional educational philosophy, for example, the spirit of John Dewey is frequently conjured up in the form of a humanist agent. Philosophy and history generally accept the fact that there was a U.S. educator named John Dewey who lived from 1859 to 1952, and who had a profound impact on educational philosophy in many places of the world. At the same time, modern
philosophy tends to conjure John Dewey as an icon in the process of trying to provide an explanation for historical change or educational reform. Very few of us still living ever met John Dewey in the flesh. We know him only by reputation. History can help philosophy to recognize that John Dewey is a character that appears in a cluster of historical narratives that have been generated and reiterated through writings, lectures, discussions, conferences, and publishers’ advertising campaigns. When we insert the name «Dewey» into analyses, we are not resurrecting a human being. That would be impossible. Rather, history can help philosophy to see that a larger-than-life spirit of «John Dewey» has been re-animated and re-circulated as a classical constituent and protagonist of stories we tell about philosophy of education. Historians can help philosophers acknowledge in responsible ways that classics and icons are created as the products of power relations, and that they serve particular ideological, epistemological, and sometimes even professional ambitions.

History can help philosophy understand terms and definitions as strategical moves within a certain historical context. The New History of Ideas as coined by Quentin Skinner for example demonstrates clearly how the political implications of terms like «liberty» and «liberalism» over time changed their meaning and enactment (Skinner 1998). Mieke Bal (2009) has analyzed how terms when transferred from one theory or methodology to another change their meaning in the course of time. Philosophy therefore can benefit from an awareness that normative definitions do not have any inherent truth value, but are rather highly flexible and often have a strong political impact.

At a more concrete level, history can help philosophy to recognize that the material formats of writing are part of the process of creating meaning (Chartier 1999, Fendler/Priem 2013). History helps us see that writing is a material practice that has had impact on epistemology, aesthetics, and conceptualizations. If philosophy treats writing as if it were stable, transparent, or essential, then shifts in semantic relationships become invisible. History can help philosophy to overcome the long-standing Cartesian legacy that allows for the separation between mind and body. History can allow the incorporation of material practices such as writing into the scope of philosophical inquiry.

Finally, history can help philosophy take note of singular or unique phenomena beyond «Kairos». If philosophy focuses on the value of inferences, ideals, or patterns, then there may be a tendency to miss or devalue once-in-a-lifetime experiences. Just as most art and literature help us to recognize and celebrate the unique and singular in life-affirming ways, history can also help philosophy to recognize and take pleasure in unrepeatable moments.

5.2 How Permeability Can Help History

In the Ranke tradition of modern history, museum exhibits and archival processes have reflected and contributed to an ideology of curation, the taxonomical ordering and classification of knowledge. Nineteenth century history in manifold ways proclaimed the power of the archive, which was complemented by a belief in linear chronology, causality, facts and thus objectivity as the inherent law of historical facts. Historicism for example did not believe in the metamorphosis of history
according to metaphysical ideas like freedom of mankind and emancipation of all humans. Rather, historicism regarded historical sources themselves as a window into the objective world and factual evidence of the past often seen as the «natural» law or form, the spirit or essence of history. History, when seen as a science as in historicism, is supposed to bear factual truth and objectivity in itself and, in addition, would not need any utopian polish or idealistic infusion. Modern historicism upheld the idea that the nation state reveals its eternal nature in national history understood as subjecting the past and its material remains, collected and processed in national archives and other collections, to scientific analysis. This approach to history has a quasi-metaphysical impact, since especially historicism as dominated by Ranke has a secular-religious undercurrent which can be attributed to its sustained belief in the spirit of God or «Geist» in history.

Philosophy can help history to theorize such descriptions. Philosophy can help to emancipate history from the tyranny of the historical record and to imagine otherwise. Historians who covet the prestige of natural scientists tend to look at archival materials as if they were data that represented the past. In such positivistic traditions of historiography, archival materials are treated as if they constituted the raw data of analysis. In the nineteenth century, when historiography started responding to pressures to become more social-scientific, there arose a tendency to treat archival material as if it were data. Even now, many modern historians tend to use the terms data and archive interchangeably. To convert archival material into an independent variable requires a series of epistemological leaps, none of which is justified on the basis of appeals to archival documentation. When historians treat the archive as if it were data, they fall prey to the same performative contradiction that was leveled against the logical positivists in the early twentieth century: their central premise – all claims must be grounded in empirical data – is itself not grounded in empirical data. Historians of all stripes are obligated to address these methodological norms, whether they support or reject them.

Philosophy can help history call attention to «the empirical turn» during which, under pressure from dominant trends in the social sciences, historians can be tempted to treat archival material as if it were data. Such historians began to refer to the archive as if it were a laboratory from which facts could be collected. However, philosophical insight can illuminate the perspective that data are all produced by research questions, and, in any case, historians have no access to laboratories. Philosophy can help historians to recognize that they are not laboratory scientists, and they cannot conduct participant surveys to substantiate claims. Philosophy can help history to engage with archival materials in dynamic and conceptually complicated ways, respecting that there is no data in history, and in full awareness that «the archive» is always curated as a product of historical fluctuations and perspectival shifts. In these ways, philosophy can help history to exorcise the phantom of the archive from historiographical investigations.

As an example of philosophical insight brought to historiography, in their study of school architecture in England, Burke & Grosvenor (2013) make a critical observation about historical research by writing the history of a book that was published in 1874. Pointing out questions for which we have no answers, Burke & Grosvenor take a philosophical approach to render invisible aspects of historical research explicit.
They use the evocative term «montage of gaps» to call attention to historiographical possibilities that are made possible when scholars use both history and philosophy to address gaps as sources of inquiry. Confronting gaps allows historians to engage archival materials in a conscientious way. They chose a topic of research about which very little can be known. What does it mean to write a history of something that is not there? We suspect that most modern historians would have refused to conduct research on Edward Robson’s 1874 book School Architecture citing the reason that there was simply not enough historical material to justify a study. Through the influence of philosophical thinking, Burke & Grosvenor can take seriously historical events about which very little can be known because there is almost no historical record.

Philosophy can help historians theorize categories such as «the Enlightenment».

Is modernity a natural outgrowth of Enlightenment or a dramatic break from Enlightenment? Historians are divided on this question, although there appear to be some patterns in the clumping of opinions. Mainstream and Marxian historians tend to prefer a stance of continuity between Enlightenment and modernity, while poststructuralist and Foucaultian historians tend to emphasize discontinuity instead. Regardless of one’s stance on the continuity question, philosophy can help history to recognize that there have been several different Enlightenments (even if we confine the scope of analysis to eighteenth-century Europe). The epistemological foundations for truth promoted in French Enlightenment historiography are different from – and sometimes incommensurable with – the epistemological foundations promoted in the Scottish Enlightenment. Historians from various schools sometimes mix and match different philosophical traditions of the Enlightenment, especially when Enlightenment is invoked as a period of history, or as a precursor for modernity. The meaning of Enlightenment also fluctuates depending on whether Enlightenment is regarded to be continuous or discontinuous with modernity. Philosophers can help historians to theorize Enlightenment commitments in ways that simultaneously acknowledge and problematize the varieties of Enlightenment commitments.

Philosophy can also help history to problematize chronology. More than a dozen books have been published with the title «History of Historical Writing». Amazingly, it seems that every book appears to be organized chronologically. To a great extent, chronology is assumed in history; and linear chronology is assumed in modern history. Philosophy can help history to see that there are several interesting problems with chronology, and that only one of the problems is the post-hoc-ergo-propter-hoc fallacy of interpretation. Chronology is not only an issue of fallacious inferences or perspectival bias. There are also more fundamental problems of chronology that can be raised when philosophy informs history. One is the problem of trying to stop time long enough to write about it. This problem is analogous to the cartographical problem of projection: it’s simply not possible to render a three-dimensional space onto a two-dimensional surface. Analogously, in historiography, it is simply not possible to render four-dimensional occurrences onto two-dimensional narratives. When we write history, we are forced to impose a particular sequence of events as a function of narrative structure. Historians thereby orchestrate the past, producing particular kinds of histories that are shaped not only by chronologies of events, but
also by a whole array of logistical choices that we make in the process of reading and writing.

A philosophical perspective helps history to recognize that researchers have to make choices about sequences when we construct an account of research methods for publication in an article or book. What may feel to historians like an orderly chronological report has been shaped by specific ideological and cultural norms including publication conventions. Montaigne’s concept of chronological order does not resemble that of Herodotus, and neither of their approaches resembles that of Carter G. Woodson. Philosophy can help history to ask: Should we start by narrating the very first encounter with the idea? Do we start with the latest, most refined, clarified, and theorized insight about an idea and let those insights color the whole story? Should historical articles conform to conventional narrative structures to make studies more accessible and more publishable? Or should we opt for less conventional narrative approaches in order to avoid hackneyed accounts and provide fresh insights and perspectives instead?

Sobe (2013) addresses the problem of chronology directly, using a philosophical device of “entanglement” to help us understand the ways in which chronology cannot be taken as given, but must instead be investigated historiographically. Sobe focuses on problems of comparative history, noting that chronology is particularly complicated when we try to talk about things like transnational influence:

Entangled history can refer to analyses of the tangling together of disparate actors, devices, discourses and practices, with the recognition that this tangling is partly accomplished by said actors, devices, discourses and practices and partly accomplished by the historian her/himself. The critical leverage of such an approach inheres in the attempt to develop situationally specific understandings of why-this-and-not-that (Sobe, 2013, p. 97).

Superimposed on those multiple chronologies is yet another level of complication that can be illuminated through philosophical reflection, namely the chronological sequence of the research process. Historians often find things in reverse chronological order – they find more recent things before they find more ancient things – and in the process of research, our earlier interpretations are very often transformed by later insights. From a philosophical perspective we can see that the research process is itself chronologically complicated and haunted by specters of past, present, and future. The chronology of the research process also shapes how it is possible to perceive history, and what historians habitually assume to be historically relevant. What about the order in which I remember things? Why shouldn’t that chronology be relevant and significant to the research process?

Permeability between history and philosophy challenges us to remember that methodologies and analytical tools – including notions of transfer, adaptation, hybridity, and translation – are also products of history, and not essential, eternal ideas that we can import without question in order to organize the past.
6. Conclusion

In writing this paper, we encountered several layers of complication, partially because we were trying to portray both the separation and the inseparability of history and philosophy. In order to accomplish both separateness and inseparability, we resorted to an array of discursive/rhetorical moves. One move in our text concerns verb tenses: to use present/infinitive tense verbs privileges philosophy; to use past tense verbs privileges history. We use more present/infinitive tenses in the sections that describe modern philosophy, and we used more simple past/preterit tenses in the parts about modern history. In many places of the narrative, the resolution is: has been to use present-perfect verb tenses.

The terminology of «history» and «philosophy» also became necessarily problematic. If we referred anthropocentrically to historians and philosophers as humanist actors (as in «philosophers can help historians to...»), then the discourse of our argument would reinscribe an actor-centered epistemology in which philosophers and historians – as people – drive historical change. However, it is also awkward to attribute motivation to academic fields as in «history can help philosophy...»). Furthermore, in modernity, it is possible to think of history as separate from historiography. However, in non-modern projects such as Foucault's, history and historiography are the same thing. In other words, history is discourse about the past; history is what we have said about the past, il n'y a pas de hors-texte. So representing the academic traditions became complicated. In each section of the narrative, the choices of nouns and verb tenses both shaped and were shaped not only by our deliberate attempts to effect critical interventions, but also by disciplinary conventions, epistemological assumptions, and habits of thought.

In the process of writing, we also had an extended debate about how we should label and contextualize Ranke's work. Should we label it as archetypical historicism, and thereby risk essentializing historicism? Or should we characterize Ranke's work as reflecting both metaphysics and historically specific floating signifiers, and thereby risk undermining the main point of our contrastive analysis? Our discursive/rhetorical strategy in this case was to offer both perspectives, one after the other, and then to call explicit attention to that strategy here in the conclusion. So, earlier in the paper we set up an analytical/pedagogical exercise that would emphasize the contrast between history and philosophy. In that section we portrayed stereotypes – maybe even caricatures – of history and philosophy as separable. We also employed caricatures of history and philosophy to emphasize particular disciplinary tendencies. Then in the closing section, we problematized the separation and talked about how impossible it is to draw a clear line between history and philosophy, either philosophically or historically. It was our rhetorical aim to construct this present text as exemplary of the possibility to allow permeability between philosophy and history in contemporary educational research. However, the assessment of whether we succeeded depends on the historical and/or philosophical viewpoint of the judge.
7. References


